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Critical Infrastructures: Background, Policy, and Implementation

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Critical Infrastructures: Background, Policy and Implementation

Summary

The nation's health, wealth, and security rely on the production and distribution of certain goods and services. The array of physical assets, processes and organizations across which these goods and services move are called critical infrastructures (e.g. electricity, the power plants that generate it, and the electric grid upon which it is distributed). Computers and communications, themselves critical infrastructures, are increasingly tying these infrastructures together. There is concern that this reliance on computers and computer networks raises the vulnerability of the nation's critical infrastructures to "cyber" attacks.

In May 1998, President Clinton released Presidential Decision Directive No. 63. The Directive set up groups within the federal government to develop and implement plans that would protect government-operated infrastructures and called for a dialogue between government and the private sector to develop a National Infrastructure Assurance Plan that would protect all of the nation's critical infrastructures by the year 2003. While the Directive called for both physical and cyber protection from both man-made and natural events, implementation focused on cyber protection against man-made cyber events (i.e. computer hackers). Those advocating the need for greater cyber security felt that this was a new vulnerability not fully appreciated by system owners and operators in either the private or public sectors. However, given the impact of the September 11 attacks on the communications, finance, and transportation infrastructures, physical protections of critical infrastructures may receive more attention.

PDD-63 was a Clinton Administration policy document. Following the events of September 11, the Bush Administration released two relevant Executive Orders (EOs). EO 13228, signed October 8, 2001 established the Office of Homeland Security. Among its duties, the Office shall "coordinate efforts to protect the United States and its critical infrastructure from the consequences of terrorist attacks." EO 13231, signed October 16, stated the Bush Administration's policy and objectives for critical infrastructure protection. These are similar to those stated in PDD-63 and assumes continuation of many PDD-63 activities. E.O. 13231, however, specifically focuses on information systems. E.O. 13231 also established the President's Critical Infrastructure Protection Board. The mission of the Board is to "recommend and coordinate programs for protecting information systems for critical infrastructures."

Prior to September 11, Congressional interest in critical infrastructure protection also focused on cyber security. Legislation was passed in 2000 to improve agencies' accountability for securing their computer systems. This year, as part of the anti-terrorism legislation, Congress expanded the ability of federal agents to track computer hackers. Bills have also been introduced to facilitate the sharing of information between government and industry. Congressional interest in the physical protection of critical infrastructures has increased as a result of September 11. Bills have been introduced to increase the physical protections at airports, nuclear plants, dams, ports, and water supplies. Increased cyber and physical security raises some privacy concerns. Other issues include cost-effectiveness and liability.

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Critical Infrastructures: Background, Policy, and Implementation

Latest Developments

President Bush signed two Executive Orders (EOs) related to critical infrastructure protection, in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks. EO 13228, signed October 8, 2001, established the Office of Homeland Security. Among its missions is the coordination of efforts to protect the United States and its critical infrastructure from the consequences of terrorist attacks. EO 13231, signed October 16, stated the Bush Administration's policy regarding critical infrastructure protection. EO 13231 also established the President's Critical Infrastructure Protection Board. Among its missions, the Board is to recommend policies and coordinate programs for protecting information systems for critical infrastructures. For further discussion of these EOs, and how they may differ from the Clinton Administration's PDD-63, see **Restructuring by the Bush Administration** on page 13.

Introduction

Certain socio-economic activities are vital to the day-to-day functioning and security of the country; for example, transportation of goods and people, communications, banking and finance, and the supply and distribution of electricity and water. These activities and services have been referred to as components of the nation's critical infrastructure. Domestic security and our ability to monitor, deter, and respond to outside hostile acts also depend on some of these activities as well as other more specialized activities like intelligence gathering and command and control of police and military forces. A serious disruption in these activities and capabilities could have a major impact on the country's well-being.¹

These activities and capabilities are supported by an array of physical assets, processes, information, and organizations forming what has been called the nation's critical infrastructures. The country's critical infrastructures are growing increasingly complex, relying on computers and, now, computer networks to operate efficiently and reliably. The growing complexity, and the interconnectedness resulting from networking, means that a disruption in one may lead to disruptions in others.

¹As a reminder of how dependent society is on its infrastructure, in May 1998, PanAmSat's Galaxy IV satellite's on-board controller malfunctioned, disrupting service to an estimated 80-90% of the nation's pagers, causing problems for hospitals trying to reach doctors on call, emergency workers, and people trying to use their credit cards at gas pumps, to name but a few.

Disruptions can be caused by any number of factors: poor design, operator error, physical destruction due to natural causes, (earthquakes, lightening strikes, etc.) or physical destruction due to intentional human actions (theft, arson, sabotage, etc.). Over the years, operators of these infrastructures have taken measures to guard against and to quickly respond to many of these risks.² However, the growing dependency of these systems on information technologies and computer networks introduces a new vector by which problems can be introduced.³

Of particular concern is the threat posed by “hackers” who can gain unauthorized access to a system and who could destroy, corrupt, steal, or monitor information vital to the operation of the system. Unlike arsonists or saboteurs, hackers can gain access from remote locations. The ability to detect and deter their actions is still being developed. While infrastructure operators are also taking measures to guard against and respond to cyber attacks, there is concern that the number of “on-line” operations is growing faster than security awareness and the use of sound security measures.

Hackers range from mischievous teenagers, to disgruntled employees, to criminals, to spies, to foreign military organizations. While the more commonly reported incidents involve mischievous teenagers (or adults), self-proclaimed “electronic anarchists”, or disgruntled (former) employees, the primary concern are criminals, spies, and military personnel from around the world who appear to be perfecting their hacking skills and who may pose a potential strategic threat to the reliable operations of our critical infrastructures.⁴

Prior to September 11, critical infrastructure protection was synonymous with cyber security to many people. Consequently, much of this report discusses cyber related activities and issues. However, the terrorist attacks of September 11, and the subsequent anthrax attacks, demonstrate the need to reexamine physical protections and to integrate this into an overall critical infrastructure policy.⁵ To the extent this happens, this report will capture it. However, specific physical protections associated with individual infrastructures is beyond the scope of this report. For CRS products related to specific infrastructure protection efforts, see **For Additional Reading**.

²Following September 11, these protections will undoubtedly be reexamined.

³Efforts to integrate the computer systems of Norfolk Southern and Conrail after their merger in June, 1999 caused a series of mishaps leaving trains misrouted, crews misscheduled, and products lost. See, “Merged Railroads Still Plagued by IT Snafus,” Computerworld, January 17, 2000, pp 20-21.

⁴The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency testified before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs (June 24, 1998) that a number of countries are incorporating information warfare into their military doctrine and training and developing operational capability. It should be noted that the U.S. military is probably the leader in developing both offensive and defensive computer warfare techniques and doctrine.

⁵Besides loss of life, the terrorist attacks of September 11 disrupted the services of a number of critical infrastructures (including telecommunications, the internet, financial markets, and air transportation). In some cases, protections already in place (like off-site storage of data, mirror capacity, etc.) allowed for relatively quick reconstitution of services. In other cases, service is still disrupted.

The President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection

President Clinton established the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) in July 1996.⁶ Its tasks were to: report to the President the scope and nature of the vulnerabilities and threats to the nation's critical infrastructures (focusing primarily on cyber threats); recommend a comprehensive national policy and implementation plan for protecting critical infrastructures; determine legal and policy issues raised by proposals to increase protections; and propose statutory and regulatory changes necessary to effect recommendations.

The PCCIP released its report to President Clinton in October 1997.⁷ While the Commission found no immediate crisis threatening the nation's infrastructures, it did find reason to take action. The rapid growth of a computer-literate population (implying a greater pool of potential hackers), the inherent vulnerabilities of common protocols in computer networks, the easy availability of hacker "tools" (available on many websites), and the fact that the basic tools of the hacker (computer, modem, telephone line) are the same essential technologies used by the general population indicated to the Commission that the threat and vulnerability exist.

The Commission's general recommendation was that greater cooperation and communication between the private sector and government was needed. Much of the nation's critical infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector. As seen by the Commission, the government's primary role (aside from protecting its own infrastructures) is to collect and disseminate the latest information on intrusion techniques, threat analysis, and ways to defend against hackers.

The Commission also proposed a strategy for action:

- facilitate greater cooperation and communication between the private sector and appropriate government agencies by: setting a top level policy-making office in the White House; establishing a council that includes corporate executives, state and local government officials, and cabinet secretaries; and setting up information clearinghouses;
- develop a real-time capability of attack warning;
- establish and promote a comprehensive awareness and education program;
- streamline and clarify elements of the legal structure to support assurance measures (including clearing jurisdictional barriers to pursuing hackers electronically); and,
- expand research and development in technologies and techniques, especially technologies that allow for greater detection of intrusions.

⁶Executive Order 13010. Critical Infrastructure Protection. Federal Register. Vol 61. No. 138. July 17, 1996. pp. 3747-3750.

⁷President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, *Critical Foundations: Protecting America's Infrastructures*, October 1997.

The Commission's report underwent interagency review to determine how to respond. That review led to a Presidential Decision Directive released in May 1998.

Presidential Decision Directive No. 63

Presidential Decision Directive No. 63 (PDD-63)⁸ set as a national goal the ability to protect the nation's critical infrastructure from intentional attacks (both physical and cyber) by the year 2003. According to the PDD, any interruptions in the ability of these infrastructures to provide their goods and services must be "brief, infrequent, manageable, geographically isolated, and minimally detrimental to the welfare of the United States."⁹

PDD-63 identified the following activities whose critical infrastructures should be protected: information and communications; banking and finance; water supply; aviation, highways, mass transit, pipelines, rail, and waterborne commerce; emergency and law enforcement services; emergency, fire, and continuity of government services; public health services; electric power, oil and gas production, and storage. In addition, the PDD identified four activities where the federal government controls the critical infrastructure: internal security and federal law enforcement; foreign intelligence; foreign affairs; and national defense.

A lead agency was assigned to each of these "sectors" (see **Table 1**). Each lead agency was directed to appoint a **Sector Liaison Official** to interact with appropriate private sector organizations. The private sector was encouraged to select a **Sector Coordinator** to work with the agency's sector liaison official. Together, the liaison official, sector coordinator, and all affected parties were to contribute to a sectoral security plan which will be integrated into a **National Infrastructure Assurance Plan** (see **Table 3** below). Each of the activities performed primarily by the federal government also were assigned a lead agency who will appoint a **Functional Coordinator** to coordinate efforts similar to those made by the Sector Liaisons.

⁸See, *The Clinton's Administration's Policy on Critical Infrastructure Protection: Presidential Decision Directive 63*, White Paper, May 22, 1998, which can be found on [http://www.ciao.gov/ciao_document_library/paper598.html].

⁹*Ibid.*

Table 1. Lead Agencies

Department/Agency	Sector/Function
Commerce	Information and Communications
Treasury	Banking and Finance
EPA	Water
Transportation	Transportation
Justice	Emergency Law Enforcement
Federal Emergency Management Agency	Emergency Fire Service
Health and Human Services	Emergency Medicine
Energy	Electric Power, Gas, and Oil
Justice	Law Enforcement and International Security
Director of Central Intelligence	Intelligence
State	Foreign Affairs
Defense	National Defense

The PDD created the position of **National Coordinator** for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-terrorism. The National Coordinator reported to the President through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.¹⁰ Among his many duties the National Coordinator chaired the **Critical Infrastructure Coordination Group**. This Group was the primary interagency working group for developing and implementing policy and for coordinating the federal government's own internal security measures. The Group included high level representatives from the lead agencies (including the Sector Liaisons), the National Economic Council, and all other relevant agencies.

Each federal agency was made responsible for securing its own critical infrastructure and was to designate a Critical Infrastructure Assurance Officer (CIAO) to assume that responsibility. The agency's current Chief Information Officer (CIO) could double in that capacity. In those cases where the CIO and the CIAO were different, the CIO was responsible for assuring the agency's information assets (databases, software, computers), while the CIAO was responsible for any other assets that make up that agency's critical infrastructure. Agencies were given 180 days from the signing of the Directive to develop their plans. Those plans were to be fully implemented within 2 years and updated every 2 years.

¹⁰President Clinton designated Richard Clarke (Special Assistant to the President for Global Affairs, National Security Council) as National Coordinator.

The PDD set up a **National Infrastructure Assurance Council**. The Council was to be a panel that included private operators of infrastructure assets and officials from state and local government officials and relevant federal agencies. The Council was to meet periodically and provide reports to the President as appropriate. The National Coordinator was to act as the Executive Director of the Council.

The PDD also called for a **National Infrastructure Assurance Plan**. The Plan is to integrate the plans from each of the sectors mentioned above and should consider the following: a vulnerability assessment, including the minimum essential capability required of the sector's infrastructure to meet its purpose; remedial plans to reduce the sector's vulnerability; warning requirements and procedures; response strategies; reconstitution of services; education and awareness programs; research and development needs; intelligence strategies; needs and opportunities for international cooperation; and legislative and budgetary requirements.

The PDD also set up a National Plan Coordination Staff to support the plan's development. This function was performed by the **Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office** (CIAO, not to be confused with the agencies' Critical Infrastructure Assurance Officers) and was placed in the Department of Commerce's Export Administration. CIAO supports the National Coordinator's efforts to integrate the sectoral plans into a National Plan, supports individual agencies in developing their internal plans, helps coordinate a national education and awareness programs, and provides legislative and public affairs support.

In addition to the above activities, the PDD called for studies on specific topics. These included issues of: liability that might arise from private firms participating in an information sharing process; legal impediments to information sharing; classification of information and granting of clearances (efforts to share threat and vulnerability information with private sector CEOs has been hampered by the need to convey that information in a classified manner); information sharing with foreign entities; and the merits of mandating, subsidizing or otherwise assisting in the provision of insurance for selected infrastructure providers.

Most of the Directive established policy-making and oversight bodies making use of existing agency authorities and expertise. However, the PDD also addressed operational concerns. The Directive called for a national capability to detect and respond to cyber attacks while they are in progress. Although not specifically identified in the Directive, the Clinton Administration proposed establishing a **Federal Intrusion Detection Network (FIDNET)** that would, together with the **Federal Computer Intrusion Response Capability (FedCIRC)** begun just prior to PDD-63, meet this goal. The Directive explicitly gave the Federal Bureau of Investigation the authority to expand its existing computer crime capabilities into a **National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC)**. The Directive called for the NIPC to be the focal point for federal threat assessment, vulnerability analysis, early warning capability, law enforcement investigations, and response coordination. All agencies were required to forward to the NIPC information about threats and actual attacks on their infrastructure as well as attacks made on private sector infrastructures

of which they become aware. Presumably, FIDNET¹¹ and FedCIRC would feed into the NIPC. According to the Directive, the NIPC would be linked electronically to the rest of the federal government and use warning and response expertise located throughout the federal government.. The Directive also made the NIPC the conduit for information sharing with the private sector through equivalent **Information Sharing and Analysis Center(s)** operated by the private sector.

While the FBI was given the lead, the NIPC also includes the Department of Defense, the Intelligence Community, and a representative from all lead agencies. Depending on the level of threat or the character of the intrusion, the NIPC may be placed in direct support of either the Department of Defense or the Intelligence Community.

Implementation of PDD-63

Selection of Sector Liaison Officials and Functional Coordinators.

All lead agencies and lead functional agencies appointed their Sector Liaison Officials and Functional Coordinators.

Identifying and Selecting Sector Coordinators. The identification of sector coordinators has proceeded with mixed results. The table below shows those individuals or groups that have agreed to act as Coordinators.

Different sectors present different challenges to identifying a coordinator. Some sectors are more diverse than others (e.g. transportation includes rail, air, waterways, and highways; information and communications include computers, software, wire and wireless communications) and raises the issue of how to have all the relevant players represented. Other sectors are fragmented, consisting of small or local entities. Some sectors, such as banking, telecommunications, and energy have more experience than others in working with the federal government and/or working collectively to assure the performance of their systems.

Besides such structural issues are ones related to competition. Inherent in the exercise is asking competitors to cooperate. In some cases it is asking competing industries to cooperate. This cooperation not only raises issues of trust among firms, but also concerns regarding anti-trust rules. Also, having these groups in direct communications with the federal government raises questions about their relationship to the federal government as governed by the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 USC Appendix) and how the Freedom of Information Act (5 USC 552) applies to them and the information that may be exchanged.

¹¹From the beginning FIDNET generated controversy both inside and outside the government. Privacy concerns, cost and technical feasibility were at issue. By the end of the Clinton Administration, FIDNET as a distributed intrusion detection system feeding into a centralized analysis and warning capability was abandoned. Each agency, however, is allowed and encouraged to use intrusion detection technology to monitor and secure their own systems.

Sector coordinators have been identified for most of the major privately operated sectors. The Association of American Railroads is the most recent to accept the duties of coordinator for the rail sector. The Department of Transportation would like to also find coordinators for air and water transportation. FEMA has not identified a single coordinator to represent the country's emergency/fire service providers. FEMA is also responsible for the area of continuity of government. Again, no single coordinator has been identified, but FEMA had discussed continuity of government issues with state and local governments in the context of the Y2K.¹² Nor has the Department of Health and Human Services identified a central coordinator for the emergency medical community. The Department of Justice also has not identified a single coordinator for emergency law enforcement but is using existing outreach programs at the FBI and the NIPC to promote awareness and education activities.

Table 2. Sector Coordinators

Lead Agency	Identified Sector Coordinators
Commerce	A consortium of 3 associations: Information Technology Assn. of America; Telecommunications Industry Assn.; U.S. Telephone Assn.
Treasury	Steven Katz - Citigroup
EPA	Assn. of Metropolitan Water Agencies
Energy	North American Electric Reliability Council and National Petroleum Council
Transportation	Association of American Railroads
Health and Human Services	
FEMA	
Justice	

Appointment of the National Infrastructure Assurance Council. The Clinton Administration released an Executive Order (13130) in July, 1999, formally establishing the council. Just prior to leaving office, President Clinton put forward the names of 18 appointees.¹³ The Order was rescinded by the Bush Administration

¹²The New Mexico Critical Infrastructure Assurance Council, an offshoot of the FBI's InfraGard efforts in the state, include the state government and other state and local agencies. The Council is referenced in the *National Plan for Information Systems Protection*. See, **National Critical Infrastructure Plan**, below.

¹³White House Press Release, dated January 18, 2000.

before the Council could meet. In Executive Order 13231¹⁴, President Bush establishes a National Infrastructure Advisory Council (with the same acronym, NIAC) whose functions are similar to those of the Clinton Council.

Selection of Agency CIAOs. All agencies made permanent or acting CIAO appointments.

Internal Agency Plans. There has been some confusion about which agencies were required to submit critical infrastructure plans. The PDD-63 directs every agency to develop and implement such a plan. A subsequent Informational Seminar on PDD-63 held on October 13, 1998 identified two tiers of agencies. The first tier included lead agencies and other “primary” agencies like the Central Intelligence Agency and Veteran’s Affairs. These agencies were held to the 180 day deadline. A second tier of agencies were identified by the National Coordinator and required to submit plans by the end of February, 1999. The “secondary” agencies were Agriculture, Education, Housing and Urban Development, Labor, Interior, General Services Administration, National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. All of these “primary” and “secondary” agencies met their initial deadlines for submitting their internal plans for protecting their own critical infrastructures from attacks and for responding to intrusions. The Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office assembled an expert team to review the plans. The plans were assessed in 12 areas including schedule/milestone planning, resource requirements, and knowledge of existing authorities and guidance. The assessment team handed back the initial plans with comments. Agencies were given 90 days to respond to these comments. Of the 22 “primary” and “secondary” agencies that submitted plans, 16 modified and resubmitted them in response to first round comments.

Initially the process of reviewing these agency plans was to continue until all concerns were addressed. Over the summer of 1999, however, review efforts slowed and subsequent reviews were put on hold as the efficacy of the reviews was debated. Some within the CIAO felt that the plans were too general and lacked a clear understanding of what constituted a “critical asset” and the interdependencies of those assets. As a result of that internal debate, the CIAO redirected its resources to institute a new program called Project Matrix. Project Matrix is a three step process by which an agency can identify and assess its most critical assets, identify the dependencies of those assets on other systems, including those beyond the direct control of the agency, and prioritize. CIAO has offered this analysis to 14 agencies, including some not designated as “primary” or “secondary” agencies, such as the Social Security Administration and the Securities and Exchange Commission. Participation by the agencies has been voluntary.

In the meantime, other agencies (i.e. those not designated as primary and secondary) apparently did not develop critical infrastructure plans. In a much later report by the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency (dated March 21, 2001),

¹⁴Executive Order 13231—Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Information Age. Federal Register. Vol. 66. No. 202. October 18, 2001. pp53063-53071. The NIAC is established on page 53069.

the Council, which was charged with reviewing agencies' implementation of PDD-63, stated that there was a misunderstanding as to the applicability of PDD-63 to all agencies. The Council asserted that all agencies were required to develop a critical infrastructure plan and that many had not, because they felt they were not covered by the Directive. Also, the Council found that of the agency plans that had been submitted, many were incomplete, had not identified their mission-critical assets, and that almost none had completed vulnerability assessments.

According to the National Plan released in January 2000 (see below), all "Phase One" and "Phase Two" agencies (presumably this refers to the "primary" and "secondary" agencies mentioned above) were to have completed preliminary vulnerability analyses and to have outlined proposed remedial actions. Again, according to the National Plan, those remedial actions were to be budgeted for and submitted as part of the agencies' FY2001 budgets submissions to the Office of Management and Budget and every year thereafter. However, given the discussion above, the comprehensiveness of these studies and plans are in question.

Neither of the Bush Administration executive orders make reference to these critical infrastructure protection plans of the agencies.

National Critical Infrastructure Plan. The Clinton Administration, after some delay, released Version 1.0 of its National Plan for Information Systems Protection in January 2000.¹⁵ The Plan focused primarily on cyber-related efforts within the federal government. A note in the Executive Summary states that a parallel Critical Physical Infrastructure Protection Plan is to be developed and possibly incorporated in Version 2.0, or later versions.¹⁶

Version 1.0 was divided between government-wide efforts and those unique to the national security community. The Plan (159 pages) will not be summarized here in any detail. The reader is referred to the CIAO website [<http://www.ciao.gov/Programs/programs.htm>]. Essentially, the Plan identified 10 "programs" under three broad objectives (see Table 3, below). Each program contained some specific actions to be taken, capabilities to be established, and dates by which these shall be accomplished. Other activities, capabilities, and dates were more general (e.g. during FY2001).

The Plan included a number of new initiatives identified by the Clinton Administration. These are identified in the appendix of this report.

¹⁵Defending America's Cyberspace. National Plan for Information Systems Protection. Version 1.0. An Invitation to a Dialogue. The White House. 2000.

¹⁶Ibid. Executive Summary. p. 13.

**Table 3. National Plan for Information Systems Protection
Version 1.0**

Goal: Achieve a critical information systems defense with an initial operating capability by December 2000, and a full operating capability by May 2003...that ensures any interruption or manipulation of these critical functions must be brief, infrequent, manageable, geographically isolated, and minimally detrimental to the welfare of the United States.	
Objectives	Programs
Prepare and Prevent	ID critical infrastructures and interdependencies and address vulnerabilities
Detect and Respond	Detect attacks and unauthorized intrusions
	Develop robust intelligence and law enforcement capabilities consistent with the law
	Share attack warnings and information in a timely manner
	Create capabilities for response, reconstitution, and recovery
Build Strong Foundations	Enhance research and development in the above mentioned areas
	Train and employ adequate numbers of information security specialists
	Make Americans aware of the need for improved cyber-security
	Adopt legislation and appropriations in support of effort
	At every step of the process ensure full protection of American citizens' civil liberties, rights to privacy, and rights to protection of proprietary information

Version 2.0 of the National Plan is to cover the private sector. The Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Protection (see below) is coordinating the private sector's input. The Bush Administration expects to release the next version of the National Plan early next year. The extent to which Version 2.0 will address physical protections remains to be seen.

Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC). PDD-63 envisaged an ISAC to be the private sector counterpart to the FBI's National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC), collecting and sharing incident and response information among its members and facilitating information exchange between government and the private sector. While the Directive conceived of a single center serving the entire private sector, the idea now is that each sector would have its own center. Progress in forming sector ISACs has been mixed.

A number of the nation's largest banks, securities firms, insurance companies and investment companies have joined together in a limited liability corporation to form a banking and finance industry ISAC. The group has contracted with an internet service provider¹⁷ (ISP) to design and operate the ISAC. Individual firms feed raw computer network traffic data to the ISAC. The ISP maintains a database of network traffic and analyzes it for suspicious behavior and provides its customers with summary reports. If suspicious behavior is detected, the analysis may be forwarded to the federal government. Anonymity is maintained between participants and outside the ISAC. The ISP will forward to its customers alerts and other information provided by the federal government. The ISAC became operational in October, 1999.

The telecommunications industry has agreed to establish an ISAC through the National Coordinating Center (NCC). The NCC is a government-industry partnership that coordinates responses to disruptions in the National Communications System. Unlike the banking and finance ISAC that uses a third party for centralized monitoring and analysis, each member firm of the NCC will monitor and analyze its own networks. If a firm suspects its network(s) have been breached, it will discuss the incident(s) within the NCC's normal forum. The NCC members will decide whether the suspected behavior is serious enough to report to the appropriate federal authorities. Anonymity will be maintained outside the NCC. Any communication between federal authorities and member firms will take place through the NCC, this includes incident response and requests for additional information¹⁸.

The electric power sector, too, has established a decentralized ISAC through its North American Electricity Reliability Council (NAERC). Much like the NCC, NAERC already monitors and coordinates responses to disruptions in the nation's supply of electricity. It is in this forum that information security issues and incidents will be shared. The National Petroleum Council is still considering setting up an ISAC with its members.

In January, 2001, the information technology industry announced its plans to form an ISAC. Members include 19 major hardware, software, and e-commerce firms, including AT&T, IBM, Cisco, Microsoft, Intel, and Oracle. The ISAC will be overseen by a board made up of members and operated by Internet Security Systems.

The country's water authorities intend to develop an appropriate ISAC model for their sector. Individual water authorities have existing lines of communications with the FBI through which they could report suspicious behavior. The same could be true for the other local and state emergency services sectors.

In addition to these individual sectors setting up or contemplating ISACs, the private sector has formed a **Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security** to share information and strategies and to identify interdependencies across sectoral

¹⁷The ISP is Global Integrity, a subsidiary of Science Applications International Corp. (SAIC).

¹⁸ Federal agencies sit on the NCC, including the NSA. One could assume that knowledge of incidents discussed in the NCC could find its way to federal investigatory authorities without formally being reported.

lines. The Partnership is a private sector initiative and has filed as a 501(c)(6) organization. A preliminary meeting was held in December 1999 and five working groups were established (Interdependencies/Vulnerability Assessment, Cross-Sector Information Sharing, Legislation and Policy, Research and Development, and Organization). The working groups meet every other month. The federal government is not officially part of the Partnership, but the CIAO acts as a liaison and has provided administrative support for meetings. Sector Liaison from lead agencies are considered ex officio members. Some entities not yet part of their own industry group (e.g. some hospitals and pharmaceutical firms) or not specifically designated as belonging to a critical infrastructure (the chemical industry) are participating in the Partnership.

Also, besides the efforts of the lead agencies to assist their sectors in considering ISACs, the NIPC offers private sector firms from across all industries a program called **INFRAGARD**. The program includes an Alert Network. Participants in the program agree to supply the FBI with two reports when they suspect an intrusion of their systems has occurred. One report is “sanitized” of sensitive information and the other provides more detailed description of the intrusion. The FBI will help the participant respond to the intrusion. In addition, all participants are sent periodic updates on what is known about recent intrusion techniques. The NIPC is working to set up local INFRAGARD chapters that can work with each other and regional FBI field offices. In January, 2001, the FBI announced it had finished establishing INFRAGARD chapters in each of its 56 field offices.

It should also be noted that the FBI has had since the 1980s a program called the **Key Assets Initiative (KAI)**. The objective of the KAI is to develop a database of information on “key assets” within the jurisdiction of each FBI field office. The program was initially begun to allow for contingency planning against physical terrorist attacks. According to testimony by a former Director of the NIPC, the program was “reinvigorated” by the NIPC and expanded to included the cyber dimension.¹⁹

Restructuring by the Bush Administration

As part of its overall redesign of White House organization and assignment of responsibilities, the new Bush Administration spent the first 8 months reviewing its options for coordinating and overseeing critical infrastructure protection. During this time, the Bush Administration continued to support the activities begun by the Clinton Administration.

The Bush Administration review was influenced by three parallel debates. First, the National Security Council (NSC) underwent a major streamlining. All groups within the Council established during previous Administrations were abolished. Their responsibilities and functions were consolidated into 17 Policy Coordination Committees (PCCs). The activities associated with critical infrastructure protection were assumed by the Counter-Terrorism and National Preparedness PCC. Whether,

¹⁹Testimony by Michael Vatis before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Technology and Terrorism. Oct. 6, 1999.

or to what extent, the NSC should remain the focal point for coordinating critical infrastructure protection (i.e. the National Coordinator came from the NSC) was unclear. Richard Clarke, himself, wrote a memorandum to the incoming Bush Administration that the function should be transferred directly to the White House.²⁰

Second, there was a continuing debate about the merits of establishing a government-wide Chief Information Officer (CIO), whose responsibilities would include protection of all federal non-national security-related computer systems and coordination with the private sector on the protection of privately owned computer systems. The Bush Administration announced mid-year its desire not to create a separate federal CIO position, but to recruit a Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget that would assume an oversight role of agency CIOs. One of reason's cited for this was a desire to keep agencies responsible for their own computer security.²¹

Third, there was the continuing debate about how best to defend the country against terrorism, in general. Some include in the terrorist threat cyber attacks on critical infrastructure. The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (the Hart-Rudman Commission) proposed a new National Homeland Security Agency. The recommendation built upon the current Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) by adding to it the Coast Guard, the Border Patrol, Customs Service, and other agencies. The Commission recommended that the new organization include a directorate responsible for critical infrastructure protection.

On May 8, the Bush Administration announced its intention to create a new office within FEMA called the **Office of National Preparedness**. The Office would act to coordinate all federal programs dealing with weapons of mass destruction consequence management. The announcement also noted that Vice-President Cheney would oversee the development of a plan to address terrorism threats using weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It appears that WMD are limited here to biological, nuclear, or chemical weapons and does not include cyber attacks against critical infrastructures.

Following the September 11 terrorist attacks President Bush signed two Executive Orders relevant to critical infrastructure protection. E.O. 13228, signed October 8, 2001 established the **Office of Homeland Security**, headed by the **Assistant to the President for Homeland Security**.²² Its mission is to “develop and coordinate the implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United States from terrorist threats and attacks.” Among its functions is the coordination of efforts to protect the United States and its critical infrastructure from the consequences of terrorist attacks. This includes strengthening measures for protecting energy production, transmission, and distribution; telecommunications;

²⁰Senior NSC Official Pitches Cyber-Security Czar Concept in Memo to Rice. *Inside the Pentagon*. January 11, 2001. p 2-3.

²¹For a discussion of this and the status of federal CIO legislation, see CRS Report RL30914, Federal Chief Information Officer (CIO): Opportunities and Challenges, by Jeffery Siefert.

²²President Bush selected Tom Ridge to head the new Office.

public and privately owned information systems; transportation systems; and, the provision of food and water for human use. Another function of the Office is to coordinate efforts to ensure rapid restoration of these critical infrastructures after a disruption by a terrorist threat or attack.

Finally, the EO also established the **Homeland Security Council**. The Council, made up of the President, Vice-President, Secretaries of Treasury, Defense, Health and Human Services, and Transportation, the Attorney General, the Directors of FEMA, FBI, and CIA and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security. Other White House and departmental officials are invited to attend Council meetings.²³ The Council advises and assists the President with respect to all aspects of homeland security. The agenda for those meetings shall be set by the Assistant to President for Homeland Security, at the direction of the President. The Assistant is also the official recorder of Council actions and Presidential decisions.

The second Executive Order (E.O. 13231) signed October 16, 2001, stated that it is U.S. policy “to protect against the disruption of the operation of information systems for critical infrastructure...and to ensure that any disruptions that occur are infrequent, of minimal duration, and manageable, and cause the least damage possible.”²⁴ This Order also established the **President’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board**. The Board’s responsibility is to “recommend policies and coordinate programs for protecting information systems for critical infrastructure...” The Order also established a number of standing committees of the Board that includes Research and Development (chaired by a designee of the Director of the Office of Science and Technology), Incident Response (chaired by the designees of the Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense), and Physical Security (also chaired by designees of the Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense). The Board is directed to propose a National Plan on issues within its purview on a periodic basis, and, in coordination with the Office of Homeland Security, review and make recommendations on that part of agency budgets that fall within the purview of the Board.

The Board is to be chaired by a **Special Advisor to the President for Cyberspace Security**.²⁵ The Special Advisor reports to both the Assistant to the President for National Security and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security. Besides presiding over Board meetings, the Special Advisor may, in consultation with the Board, propose policies and programs to appropriate officials to ensure protection of the nation’s information infrastructure and may coordinate with the Director of OMB on issues relating to budgets and the security of computer networks.

²³For more information on the structure of the Homeland Security Council and the Office of Homeland Security, see CRS Report RL31148. *Homeland Security: The Presidential Coordination Office*, by Harold Relyea.

²⁴Executive Order 13231—Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Information Age. Federal Register. Vol. 86. No. 202. Oct. 18, 2001.

²⁵President Bush designated Richard Clarke.

Finally, the Order also established the **National Infrastructure Advisory Council**. The Council is to provide advice to the President on the security of information systems for critical infrastructure. The Council's functions include enhancing public-private partnerships, monitoring the development of ISACs, and encouraging the private sector to perform periodic vulnerability assessments of critical information and telecommunication systems.

In many respects, the Bush Administration policy statements regarding critical infrastructure protection are a continuation of PDD-63. The fundamental policy statements are the essentially the same: the protection of infrastructures critical to the people, economy, essential government services, and national security. Also, the goal of the government's efforts are to ensure that any disruption of the services provided by these infrastructures be infrequent, of minimal duration, and manageable. The infrastructures identified as critical are essentially the same. There is to be an interagency group (the Homeland Security Council and the President's Critical Infrastructure Protection Board in EO 13228 and 13231, respectively, replaces the Critical Infrastructure Coordination Group of PDD-63) to develop policies and coordinate activities. Functional areas of concern are similar (i.e. research and development, response coordination, intelligence, etc.). The President shall be advised by a Council made up of private sector executives, academics, and State and local officials. The Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO) and the National Infrastructure Protection Center (at the FBI) are left in place, as are the liaison efforts between lead agencies and the private sector and State and local governments, and the structures set up for information sharing.

There are two primary differences, however. First, the Office of Homeland Security has overall authority for coordinating critical infrastructure protection against terrorist threats and attacks. Those responsibilities associated with information systems of critical infrastructures are delegated to the President's Critical Infrastructure Protection Board. Furthermore the Board's responsibilities for protecting the physical assets of the nation's information systems are to be defined by the Assistant to President for National Security and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security. While PDD-63 focused primarily on cyber security, it gave the National Coordinator responsibility to coordinate the physical and cyber security for all critical infrastructures.

Second, the "National Coordinator" is now a Special Advisor to the President rather than a member of the National Security Council staff. However, the Special Advisor still reports to Assistant to President for National Security in addition to the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security. It is not clear what additional authority the new position grants the individual serving as Special Advisor. The E.O. specifically grants the Special Advisor the authority to coordinate with the Director of OMB on budgetary matters.

Issues

Roles and Responsibilities. One of the issues associated with PDD-63 was whether it duplicated, superseded, or overturned existing information security responsibilities. Although the Directive dealt with infrastructures issues beyond just computer systems and also considered physical protections, its implementation

focused on “cyber” threats and vulnerabilities. In this respect, it was an extension of the government’s existing efforts in computer security. The Directive sought to use existing authorities and expertise as much as possible in assigning responsibilities. Nevertheless, the Directive did set up new entities that, at least at first glance, assumed responsibilities previously assigned to others.

The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (P.L. 104-13) placed the responsibility for establishing government-wide information resources management policy with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. Those policies are outlined in OMB Circular A-130. Appendix III of the Circular incorporates responsibilities for computer security as laid out in the Computer Security Act of 1987.²⁶ The Computer Security Act requires all agencies to inventory their computer systems and to establish security plans commensurate with the sensitivity of information contained on them. Agencies are suppose to submit summaries of their security plans along with their strategic information resources management plan to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The agencies are to follow technical, managerial, and administrative guidelines laid out by OMB, the Department of Commerce, the General Services Administration, and the Office of Personnel Management and should include (as detailed in the OMB Circular) incidence response plans, contingencies plans, and awareness and training programs for personnel. The Director of OMB was given the authority by the Computer Security Act to comment on those plans.

Under PDD-63, agencies submitted plans (not dissimilar in content to those called for in the Computer Security Act of 1987 and detailed in OMB Circular A-130 Appendix III) to the CIAO. The Critical Infrastructure Coordination Group assembled an expert review team to review these plans (an “ad hoc” team was set up at CIAO). It was not readily apparent who had the primary role to review and comment of an agency’s security plan?²⁷ Who determined whether an agency’s obligation to creating an adequate plan have been met?

It is not yet clear if E.O. 13231 will lead to the same issues. The E.O. specifically reaffirms OMB’s role in developing and overseeing the implementation of government-wide information security policy (and the roles of the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence in the case of national security-related systems). The E.O. goes on to reiterate the responsibility of the Director of OMB (or the Assistant to the President for National Security in the case of national security-related systems) to report to the President and the agency head any

²⁶Appendix III does not apply to information technology that supports certain critical national security missions as defined in 44 USC 3502(9) and 10 USC 2315. Policy for these national security systems, i.e. telecommunications and information systems containing classified information or used by the intelligence or military community, has been assigned by national security directives to the Department of Defense.

²⁷It should be noted that the General Accounting Office has reported that the oversight of agency computer security measures to date has been inadequate. See, U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Security. Weaknesses Continue to Place Critical Federal Operations and Assets at Risk. GAO-01-600T. April 5, 2001. Testimony before the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, Committee on Energy and Commerce. House of Representatives.

deficiencies in security practices. The Board is instructed to assist the Director of OMB in this function. However, the E.O. also explicitly allows the Chair (i.e. the Special Advisor to the President), and the Board, to propose policies and programs to “appropriate” officials to ensure the protection of information systems of critical infrastructures. Will these lines of authority be clearly exercised?

Incident response is another area where roles and responsibilities are not defined clearly. Among the responsibilities assigned to the Department of Commerce by OMB Circular A-130 Appendix III is the coordination of agency computer incident response activities to promote sharing of incident response information and related vulnerabilities. This function has now migrated over to the General Services Administration which has established a Federal Computer Incident and Emergency Response Capability (FedCIRC). Consistent with OMB Circular A-130, the Government Information Security Reform Act, passed as Title X, Subtitle G in the FY2001 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 106-398) requires agencies to report incidents to appropriate officials at GSA. But, PDD-63 stated and the National Plan, Version 1.0 reiterated, that the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) will provide the principal means of facilitating and coordinating the federal government’s response to an incident, mitigating attacks, investigating threats, and monitoring reconstitution efforts. Are the lines of authority clearly established between the different organizations many of which are tasked with doing things that sound similar?²⁸ What authority or influence will the FBI, as manager of the NIPC, have over these organizations? Also, the NIPC is responsible for warning, responding to, and investigating intrusions. Are these functions compatible?²⁹ E.O. 13231 reiterates the NIPC’s involvement in incident coordination and crisis response, in coordination with the Board, but makes no specific mention of FedCIRC. Also, it is not clear to what extent the NIPC is involved in coordinating the response to physical attacks on critical infrastructures. E.O. 13228 grants the Office of Homeland Security the leading role in responding to physical attacks on critical infrastructures other than the physical assets of information systems. E.O. 13228 raises its own issues regarding the relationships between the Office of Homeland Security, FEMA, and the National Security Council.³⁰

Another area in question is the future role of the CIAO. The CIAO acted as the staff for the National Coordinator under PDD-63. E.O. 13231 makes reference to the continued role of the CIAO in information infrastructure protection, especially in the area of outreach to the private sector and coordination with information sharing centers. It also is directed to provide administrative support to the new NIAC.

²⁸In recent testimony to Congress, the General Accounting Office noted that the mission of the NIPC has not been fully defined, leading to differing interpretations by different agencies. Also, the manpower support from and information sharing with other agencies has not materialized as envisioned. See, General Accounting Office, *Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in Developing Analysis, Warning, and Response Capabilities*. GAO-01-769, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information, Senate Judiciary Committee. May 22, 2001.

²⁹This point is alluded to by Michael O’Neil, “Securing Our Critical Infrastructure: What Lurks Beyond Y2K,” *Legal Times*, Week of Jan. 25, 1999.

³⁰See CRS Report RL31148. *Homeland Security*. Op. Cit .pp 7-8.

However, E.O. 13231 also allows the Special Advisor to create yet a different staff within the White House. Furthermore, the E. O. authorizes a staff for the President's Critical Infrastructure Protection Board. How are these three staffs reconciled?

There was another bureaucratic issued raised by PDD-63. Prior to the Computer Security Act of 1987, the Reagan Administration established the National Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Committee.³¹ The Committee consists of 22 civilian and defense agencies. The National Security Agency was named National Manager. The Committee was tasked with setting operating policies governing the nation's telecommunications system, its classified information systems, and "other sensitive information." The Computer Security Act of 1987 was enacted in part out of congressional concern that the Committee might over-classify government-held information³². Did PDD-63, does the Bush Administration's E.O.s, by couching critical infrastructure protection in national security terms and combining DOD and NSA professionals with civilian professionals in operative functions, blur the distinction between classified and unclassified (or national security and civilian) systems which was a primary focus of the Computer Security Act of 1987?³³ Does taking information infrastructure protection out of the NSC and putting it in the White House address this issue?

Costs. An estimate of the amount of money spent by the Federal government on critical infrastructure protection is included in the President's Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism. The Bush Administration estimated that it requested \$2.6 billion for critical infrastructure protection for FY2002. This is an estimate based on inputs supplied to OMB from the agencies. According to the report, spending on critical infrastructure protection has been increasing over for the last 4 years (see **Appendix**). Funding for most critical infrastructure protection activities is located in larger accounts and not readily visible in either agency budgets or in Congressional appropriations. The estimate includes both physical and cyber protections. In the previous year's report, critical infrastructure protection activities were broken down further (e.g. system protections, training). The 2001 report does not break activities down further.

Many of the agencies' activities are part of on-going administrative duties. These activities, if not previously done (which appears to be the case in many agencies), will require the reallocation of personnel time and effort, presumably at the expense of other activities or supported by additional resources. The resources required to meet PDD-63 requirements are supposed to be part of the agencies' internal plans. Some of the costs will not be known until after vulnerability assessments are done and remedial actions determined.³⁴ Also, each agency must

³¹National Security Decision Directive, NSDD-145. September 17, 1984.

³²House Report 100-153(I).

³³ This point is made by the Electronic Privacy Information Center in its report, *Critical Infrastructure Protection and the Endangerment of Civil Liberties* (1998) and can be found on the Center's webpage at [<http://www.epic.org/security/infowar/epic-cip.html>].

³⁴The Government Information Security Reform Act (Title X, Subtitle G in the FY2001 (continued...))

develop and implement education and awareness training programs. Agency costs may not be insignificant. According to OMB, the IRS alone estimated a vulnerability analysis of its systems will cost \$58 million.³⁵ The Plan outlines efforts at the Department of Energy to improve its network security. Total costs were expected to be \$80 million (\$45 million for operational security measures). There are also those expenditures associated with the PDD-63 initiatives, such as the education and training programs (Federal Cyber Service).

In addition, the Bush Administration has begun assessing the technical, fiscal, and political feasibility of developing a parallel but separate government-only information network (dubbed Govnet). The purpose of the network would be to have increased security without hampering the operations of the commercial network. If the Bush Administration decides to pursue a separate government information network, additional resources would be required.³⁶

Potential private sector costs are also unknown at this time.³⁷ Some sectors are already at the forefront in both physical and computer security and are sufficiently protected or need only marginal investments. Others are not and will have to devote more resources. The ability of certain sectors to raise the necessary capital may be limited, such as metropolitan water authorities which may be limited by regulation, or emergency fire which may function in a small community with a limited resources. Even sectors made up of large well capitalized firms are likely to make additional expenditures only if they can identify a net positive return on investment.

Affecting these business decisions will be issues of risk and liability. As part of its outreach efforts, the CIAO has helped the auditing, accounting, and corporate directors communities identify and present to their memberships the responsibilities governing board of directors and corporate officers have, as part of their fiduciary responsibilities, in managing the risk to their corporation's information assets. The Institute of Internal Auditors, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, the Information Systems Audit and Control Association and the National Association of Corporate Directors have formed a consortium and held "summits" around the country in an outreach effort. The main point of their discussion can best be summed up by the following expert from a paper presented at these summits:

³⁴(...continued)

Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 106-398) requires agencies to report deficiencies in their information security programs as part of their performance review and to include in their report, how much it will cost to correct the deficiency. This, however, applies only to protection of information systems, and not to other critical assets of the agency.

³⁵Conversation with OMB officials, 11 February, 1999.

³⁶See, "Secure Network Proposal Stirs Debate Among Telecom Companies" in the Oct. 15, 2001 Daily Briefing on the GovExec.com web page [www.govexec.com/dailyfed/1001/101501tj1.htm].

³⁷The cyber security market is estimated at \$10 billion in products and services (see "Picking the Locks on the Internet Security Market." Redherring.com. July 24, 2001). This probably includes, however, some government expenditures. It also does not include physical security measures.

“The consensus opinion from our analysts is that all industries and companies should be equally concerned about information technology security issues because it is an issue that has an enormous potential to negatively impact the valuation of a company’s stock...it must be the responsibility of corporate leaders to ensure these threats are actually being addressed on an ongoing basis. At the same time, the investment community must keep the issue front and center of management.”³⁸

There is also the question of downstream liability, or third party liability. In the denial-of-service attacks that occurred in early 2000, the attacks were launched from “zombie” computers; computers upon which had been placed malicious code that was subsequently activated. What responsibility do the owners of those “zombie” computers have to protect their systems from being used to launch attacks elsewhere? What responsibility do service providers have to protect their customers? According to some, it is only a matter of time before the courts will hear cases on these questions.³⁹

Costs to the private sector may also depend on the extent to which the private sector is compelled to protect their critical infrastructure versus their ability to set their own security standards. The current thinking is the private sector should voluntarily join the effort. However, given the events of September 11, the private sector may be compelled politically, if not legally, to increase physical protections. But, what happens if a sector does not take actions the federal government feels are necessary?

In an unrelated matter, but one that intersects with the efforts of critical infrastructure protection, the financial services industry and the health care industry are being required to follow new guidelines issued by their regulatory agencies aimed at protecting the privacy of their customer data bases. Pursuant to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, federal regulators released in February, 2001, guidelines that the industry must follow. Likewise, the Bush Administration is suppose to release by this summer security rules that the health care industry must follow to comply with the 1996 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA). The guidelines issued for the financial services industry are general (assess risks, have written policies and procedures to control the risk, implement and test those policies, and update them as necessary). The costs that are associated with these efforts might be a guide for what it would cost if further rules were issued related to protecting information systems upon which the nation’s critical infrastructures depend.⁴⁰

³⁸From an paper entitled *Information Security Impacting Securities Valuations*, by A. Marshall Acuff, Jr., Salomon Smith Barney Inc.

³⁹See, “IT Security Destined for the Courtroom.” *Computer World*.. May 21,2001. Vol 35. No. 21.

⁴⁰For more information on HIPPA, see CRS Report RL30620. *Health Information Standards, Privacy, and Security: HIPPA’s Administrative Simplification Regulations*, by Stephen Redhead. For more information on implementation of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, see CRS Report RS20185, *Privacy Protection for Customer Financial Information*, by Maureen Murphy.

Information Sharing. The information sharing called for in PDD-63 — internal to the federal government, between the federal government and the private sector, and between private firms — (and alluded to in the Bush Administration’s E.O.s) raises a number of issues. Some of these issues are addressed in bills introduced this session and last (see **Congressional Action**).

Critical infrastructure policy calls for information to flow between agencies via FedCIRC and the NIPC. What kind of information will be flowing? Will reporting consist of raw network traffic data or just reports of incidents? Will content be monitored or just the packet headers?⁴¹ Will reporting be in real-time or after-the-fact? How does this impact the privacy and confidentiality of the information provided? The Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988 (5 U.S.C. 552a) governs the exchange of records between government agencies. It is not yet clear how the goals of the NIPC and FedCIRC are impacted by the Act or how the goals of the Act may be impacted by the NIPC and FedCIRC missions.

Since much of what is considered to be critical infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector, implementing PDD-63 relies to a large extent on the ability of the private sector and the federal government to share information. However, it is unclear how open the private sector and the government will be in sharing information. The private sector primarily wants from the government information on potential threats which the government may want to protect in order not to compromise sources or investigations. In fact, much of the threat assessment done by the federal government is considered classified.⁴² For its part, the government wants specific information on intrusions which companies may hold as proprietary or which they may want to protect to prevent adverse publicity. Success will depend on the ability of each side to demonstrate it can hold in confidence the information exchanged. According to the GAO testimony cited earlier, there is little or no formalized flow of information yet from the private sector to the federal government, in general, or the NIPC specifically.⁴³

This issue is made more complex by the question of how the information exchanged will be handled within the context of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Proponents of PDD-63 would hope to exempt the information from public disclosure under the existing FOIA statute. Those more critical of the Directive are concerned that PDD-63 will expand the government’s ability to hold more information as classified or sensitive.⁴⁴

⁴¹Information travels through the system in packets containing the information itself (content) and a header which contain addresses and instructions on how to handle the information.

⁴²There are precedents for sharing classified information with private infrastructure operators, and it has been mentioned that these situations might be a model for sharing such information with ISACs and their members, if proper controls are in place. This, however, may involve additional expense and procedural issues for those industries or firms not familiar with handling such information.

⁴³Op. Cit. General Accounting Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection.

⁴⁴Op. cit. EPIC

Another question has been raised about the FBI's INFRAGARD program. For example, are firms who volunteer to participate in the program given additional or better information than what is available through the FBI outside the program?

Finally, the information exchanged between private firms within the context of the Sector Coordinators and the ISACS raises antitrust concerns, as well as concerns about sharing information that might unduly benefit competitors.

Privacy/Civil Liberties? The PPCIP made a number of recommendations that raised concerns within the privacy and civil liberty communities. These included allowing employers to administer polygraph tests to their computer security personnel, and requiring background checks for computer security personnel. The PPCIP also recommended allowing investigators to get a single trap and trace court order to expedite the tracking of hacker communications across jurisdictions, if possible. Another area of concern is the monitoring network traffic in order to detect intrusions. Traffic monitoring has the potential to collect vast amount of information on who is doing what on the network. What, if any, of that information should be treated as private and subject to privacy laws? While recognizing a need for some of these actions, the privacy and civil liberty communities have questioned whether proper oversight mechanisms can be instituted to insure against abuse.

PDD-63 stated that individual liberties and rights to privacy were to be preserved as the Directive is implemented. The National Plan states that it was the intent of the Clinton Administration to pass all critical infrastructure efforts through the lens of privacy issues. In addition to promised vigorous and thorough legal reviews of Plan programs, the Plan proposes an annual colloquium on Cyber Security, Civil Liberties, and Citizens' Rights between the representatives of the federal government and outside groups.

The USA Patriot Act (i.e. the anti-terrorism bill passed October 26, 2001 as P.L. 107-56), passed in the wake of the September 11 attacks, contained a number of expansions in government surveillance, investigatory, and prosecutorial authority about which the privacy and civil liberties communities have had concern. Most of these issue are beyond the scope of this report.⁴⁵ However, included in the Act is the authority for investigators to seek a single court order to authorize the installation and use of a pen register or a trap and trace device anywhere in the country in order to "record or decode electronic or other impulses to the dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information used in the processing or transmitting of wire or electronic communications..."⁴⁶ The law also defines a "computer trespasser" as one who accesses a "protected computer" without authorization and, thus, has no reasonable expectation to privacy of communications to, through, or from the protected

⁴⁵See CRS Report RS21051, *Terrorism Legislation: Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001*, by Charles Doyle and *Terrorism and Civil Liberties*, by Charles Doyle in the Legal Issues/Law Enforcement section of the CRS Terrorism Briefing Book.

⁴⁶See Section 216 of P.L. 107-56.

computer.⁴⁷ The law goes on to stipulate the conditions under which someone under the color of law may intercept such communications.

Another issue is to what extent will monitoring and responding to cyber attacks permit the government to get involved in the day-to-day operations of private infrastructures? The PCCIP suggested possibly modifying the Defense Production Act (50 USC Appendix, 2061 *et seq*) to provide the federal government with the authority to direct private resources to help reconstitute critical infrastructures suffering from a cyber attack. This authority exists now regarding the supply and distribution of energy and critical materials in an emergency. Suppose that the computer networks managing the nation's railroads were to "go down" for unknown but suspicious reasons. What role would the federal government play in allocating resources and reconstituting rail service?

Congressional Actions

Congress's interest in protecting the nation's critical infrastructure spans its oversight, legislative, and appropriating responsibilities. Prior to September 11, much of the Congressional activity regarding critical infrastructure protection focused on oversight. A number of committees have held hearings on various aspects of the issue over the last few years. These include the Senate Judiciary's Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information and the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Oversight, the House Judiciary's Subcommittee on Crime, the Senate Committee on Small Business, the House Science Committee's Technology Subcommittee, the Senate Government Affairs Committee, and the House Government Reform Committee's Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and Technology, which in September 2000, released a report card rating how well agencies were protecting their information assets.

While there was much activity administratively, on the part of the Clinton Administration, and in oversight by the Congress, legislation moved more slowly.

In the 106th Congress a number of bills were introduced that addressed one or another issue associated with PDD-63. A couple bills were directly related to PDD-63. S. 2702 required the President to report to Congress on the specific actions being taken by agencies to implement PDD-63. This requirement was later added as an amendment to the FY2001 Department of Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 106-398). That report which was prepared at the end of the Clinton Administration was released by the Bush Administration in January, 2001.⁴⁸ H.R. 4246 directly addressed FOIA and anti-trust concerns associated with ISACs by defining a "cyber security web site" and exempting those websites from FOIA access and anti-trust litigation as long as information contained on those sites are not used to impede free market functions. Also, the bill explicitly allowed the federal government to set up working groups of

⁴⁷See Section 217 of P.L. 107-56.

⁴⁸Report to the President of the United States on the Status of Federal Critical Infrastructure Protection Activities. January 2001. 203p.

federal officials to work with industry groups without such groups being considered as federal advisory committees.

Other bills dealt more with computer security in general. S. 1993 amended Chapter 35 USC 44 (related to the Paperwork Reduction Act), to strengthen information security practices throughout the federal government by adding a separate subchapter specifically dedicated to information security. Among other things, the bill requires agencies to have an annual outside assessment of their computer security plans and practices and calls on the Comptroller General to report on those reviews. The bill was attached to the FY2001 Defense Authorization Act (Title X, Subtitle G (referred to as the Government Information Security Reform Act in P.L. 106-398)). Another bill that did not make it into law, H.R. 5024, would have transferred many of the computer security responsibilities given the Director of OMB by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 to a Government-wide Chief Information Officer located outside OMB.

A number of other bills were introduced that addressed issues such applying trap and trace procedures to tracking hackers across jurisdictions, modifying thresholds and penalties in computer crime statutes, and organizational changes meant to deal better with computer crime and cyber-terrorism. Also, there have been and continue to be a number of other bills introduced that relate to privacy, encryption, public key policies, computer fraud, etc. These issues are tangentially related to PDD-63.⁴⁹

The 107th Congress has continued its oversight of the efforts to protect the nation's critical infrastructure with numerous hearings on critical infrastructure protection and computer security. Prior to September 11, a few bills were introduced relating to critical infrastructure protection. H.R. 1158 would establish a National Homeland Security Agency along the lines recommended by the Hart-Rudman Commission. In a related effort, H.R. 1292, the Homeland Security Strategy Act of 2001 called for the President to develop a Homeland Security Strategy that protects the territory, critical infrastructure, and citizens of the United States from the threat or use of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, cyber or conventional weapons. H.R. 1259 would enhance the ability of the National Institute of Standards and Technology to improve computer security (NIST). Among its actions, the bill would authorize NIST, in consultation with other appropriate agencies, to assist agencies in responding to computer intrusions, to perform evaluation and tests of agency security programs and to report the results of those test to Congress, and to establish a computer security fellowship program. H.R. 2435 (similar to H.R. 4246 introduced in the 106th Congress) would exempt information related to cyber security in connection with critical infrastructure protection from FOIA. Its counterpart in the Senate is S. 1456. S. 1407 would support a National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (this was included in the USA Patriot Act). H.R. 3394 would authorize funding for NSF to support basic research in computer and network security, to establish computer and network security centers, and to support institutions of higher learning in establishing or improving computer and network security programs at all levels. The bill also authorizes funding for NIST to establish

⁴⁹For an overview of these issues, see CRS Report 98-67, *Internet: An Overview of Six Key Policy Issues Affecting Its Use and Growth*, by Marcia Smith et al.

a program that would support computer security programs at institutions of higher learning that have entered into partnerships with for-profit entities and to support fellowships at those institutions in computer security.

Since September 11, a number of bills have been introduced to increase physical protections of various infrastructures: H.R. 2060, H.R. 2795, S. 1546 (agroterrorism), S. 1608 (waster water facility security), S. 1593 (R&D related to security at waste water facilities), H.R. 3178, H.R. 3227 (radiological contamination R&D), H.R. 2925 (P.L. 107-69, protection of dams and related facilities), S. 1214 and S. 1215 (port security), H.R. 2983 (security at nuclear facilities), S. 1447 (aviation security). For more information on these and other activities related to the security (primarily physical security) of specific infrastructures, see the Prevention: Security Enhancements section of the CRS Terrorism Briefing Book.

For Additional Reading

CRS Report RS21026, *Terrorism and Security: Issue Facing the Water Infrastructure Sector*, by Claudia Copeland and Betsy Cody.

CRS Report RS21050, *Hazardous Materials Transportation: Vulnerability to Terrorists, Federal Activities and Options to Reduce Risks*, by Paul Rothberg.

CRS Report RL30861, *Capitol Hill Security: Capabilities and Planning*, by Paul Dwyer and Stephen Stathis.

CRS Report RL31150, *Selected Aviation Security Legislation in the Aftermath of the September 11 Attack*, by Robert Kirk.

CRS Report RL31151, *Aviation Security Technology and Procedures: Screening Passengers and Baggage*, by Daniel Morgan.

CRS Report RL31148, *Homeland Security: The Presidential Coordination Office*, by Harold Relyea.

CRS Report RS20272, *FEMA's Mission: Policy Directives for the Federal Emergency Management Agency*, by Keith Bea.

CRS Report RL30735, *Cyberwarfare*, by Steven Hildreth.

Appendix

FY2001 Budget

According to the President's Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism, the Bush Administration estimated that it was requesting \$2.6 billion in FY2002 for activities related to protecting the nation's critical infrastructure. This was an estimate by OMB, based on canvassing individual agencies to identify activities that constitute protection of their critical infrastructure or support the protection of infrastructure in the private sector. It includes the protection of cyber assets, information, and other physical assets.

The Clinton Administration had proposed a number of specific initiatives in its FY2001 budget estimate for critical infrastructure protection. These are listed below. The Bush Administration has supported these efforts as well. In addition, the Bush Administration has begun assessing the technical, fiscal, and political feasibility of developing a parallel but separate government-only information network. The purpose of the network would be to have increased security without hampering the operations of the commercial network. Initial response from the private sector has been cool.⁵⁰

Federal Cyber Services Training and Education

This initiative is an effort to improve the recruitment and retention of a highly skilled government information technology workforce, including increasing the pool of skilled information security specialists. The initiative consists of a number of different activities.

One activity would be a ROTC-like program where the federal government, through the National Science Foundation (NSF), will pay for a 2-year undergraduate or graduate degree in information security in exchange for government service in information security, called the Scholarship for Service (SFS). The scholarship would be for two years at schools with accredited information technology programs. Students participating in the program would also do summer internships at government agencies and attend periodic conferences.

A second activity is called the Center for Information Technology Excellence (CITE). CITE would provide continuing training for existing federal systems administrators and information systems security officers. CITE will be managed and run by the Office of Personnel Management. Training will be offered by selected sites both inside and outside the federal government. Curricula will be based on key competencies and a certification process will demonstrate that those competencies have been demonstrated. It should be noted that the National Security Agency runs a similar program geared toward the national security community. NSA has identified 8 universities as centers of information technology excellence. The CITE program

⁵⁰Secure Network Proposal Stirs Debate Among Telecom Companies. October 15, 2001. [www.govexec.com/dailyfed/1001/101501j1.htm]. Also, Bush Plan to Unplug Feds From Internet Draws Criticism. *ComputerWorld*. Nov. 5, 2001.p7.

identified here would use the experience of the NSA program to establish a similar capability for the entire federal government.

A third activity would be a high school and secondary school outreach program to educate high school students and teachers and the general public about information security. The fourth activity would be to promote information security awareness within the federal workforce.

The Bush Administration requested \$11.8 million for this program in FY2002.

Permanent Expert Review Team

This would make permanent the review of agencies' internal security plans, vulnerability analyses, etc. The team would be supported through the National Institute of Standards and Technology. The Bush Administration requested funds for this effort. However, neither of the Executive Orders make mention of these plans or their review.

Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection

This was a proposed research and development fund operated through the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to support research that might not otherwise be conducted by the private sector or defense agencies. Currently nearly all of the current information security research and development funds go to defense agencies. While operated through NIST, the Institute would have reported to a Federal Coordinating Council consisting of the President's Science Advisor, the Deputy Director/ Office of Management and Budget, the Director/National Security Agency, the Director/NIST, and the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-Terrorism. The Institute would have consulted with the National Infrastructure Advisory Council and the Sector Coordinators.

Congress last year did not support this initiative, although they did provide \$5 million for NIST to support cyber security research grants. The Bush Administration requested \$5 million to continue this effort.

Below is a table from the Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism that lists by agencies the amount of funding estimated to support critical infrastructure protection. These are figures representing the Administration's initial budget, which assumed current services. The 2001 figures include both cyber and physical protections of critical infrastructures. Only those cyber security protections associated with what would be considered critical systems were included. Other physical protections more explicitly related to combating terrorism are included elsewhere in the report. It is not entirely clear how the distinction is made.⁵¹ It should also be noted that the figures stated for past years have changed for some

⁵¹According to an OMB official, for example, placing national guardsmen around nuclear power plants might be considered a Combating Terrorism activity. Other more routine physical protections of the plant might be considered critical infrastructure protection.

agencies. OMB attributes this increasing improvement in the characterization of funds. Health and Human Resources increased significantly for FY2000, while the figure for the Treasury Department dropped.

Table A.1. Critical Infrastructure Protection Funding by Department
(millions \$)

Department	FY98 actual	FY99 actual	FY00 actual	FY01 request	FY02 request
Agriculture	5.2	9.9	8.2	21.2	9.1
Commerce	9.1	21.8	14.4	27.5	35.6
Education	3.6	4.4	6.7	12.0	8.9
Energy	3.8	11.9	28.1	44.3	41.4
EOP	0.1	0.6	0.5	0.3	2.2
EPA	0.0	0.2	0.7	2.0	2.0
FEMA	0.0	0.0	0.4	1.5	1.5
GSA	0.0	3.00	1.0	8.0	11.0
HHS	37.0	44.5	69.6	96.8	97.6
Interior	1.3	1.6	2.1	1.5	1.9
Justice	25.8	55.3	42.2	48.1	55.7
NASA	40.0	42.0	66.00	117.0	117.0
Labor	3.8	5.4	7.9	14.5	22.8
NSF	19.2	21.4	26.7	43.9	
National Security (incl. DOD)	926.4	1,217.7	1,404.1	1800.0	1859.4
Nuclear Regulatory Commission	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.2	0.4
OPM	0.0	0.0	.9	.9	0.0
Transportation	21.5	24.4	44.5	79.5	110.0
Treasury	31.5	50.1	47.4	53.2	64.3
State	6.0	19.0	40.0	31.2	31.9
Social Security	60.7	57.1	48.9	71.4	101.3
Veteran's Affairs	0.00	0.00	17.33	17.39	21.7
Grand Total					

\ data from Office of Management and Budget. Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism. July 2001